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THE	  VOLCKER	  RULE:	  A	  BRIEF	  POLITICAL	  HISTORY	  
By	  Kimberly	  D.	  Krawiec	  &	  Guangya	  Liu*	  	  I.	  INTRODUCTION	  On	  December	  10,	  2013,	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency	  (OCC),	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System	  (the	  “Fed”),	  the	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Corporation	  (FDIC),	  the	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC),	  and	  the	  Commodity	  Futures	  Trading	  Commission	  (CFTC)	  (hereafter,	  collectively	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Volcker	  Agencies”)	  adopted	  final	  regulations	  (the	  "Final	  Rule")	  to	  implement	  section	  619	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act,	  popularly	  known	  as	  the	  "Volcker	  rule."	  	  The	  Final	  Rule	  arrived	  more	  than	  two	  years	  after	  the	  proposed	  rule	  and	  more	  than	  three	  years	  after	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  signing.	  	  	  Full	  Volcker	  rule	  implementation	  will	  take	  even	  longer.	  Recently,	  for	  example,	  the	  Fed	  granted	  banking	  entities	  an	  extension	  until	  July	  21,	  2017,	  to	  conform	  ownership	  interests	  in	  and	  relationships	  with	  certain	  “legacy”	  covered	  funds.1	  	  And,	  in	  a	  controversial	  move	  that	  President	  Obama	  has	  threatened	  to	  veto,	  House	  republicans	  (who	  uniformly	  opposed	  Dodd-­‐Frank)	  were	  joined	  by	  29	  democrats	  to	  pass	  a	  bill	  that	  would	  extend	  that	  date	  to	  2019.2	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  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  Order	  Approving	  Extension	  of	  Conformance	  Period	  Under	  Section	  13	  of	  the	  Bank	  Holding	  Company	  Act	  (Dec.	  18,	  2014).	  2	  H.R.37	  -­‐	  Promoting	  Job	  Creation	  and	  Reducing	  Small	  Business	  Burdens	  Act,	  114th	  Congress	  (2015-­‐2016).	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While	  federal	  regulators	  and	  others	  defend	  these	  extensions	  as	  necessary	  to	  ease	  compliance	  burdens	  and	  avoid	  market	  disruptions	  caused	  by	  banks	  dumping	  covered	  assets	  into	  the	  marketplace,	  critics,	  including	  Paul	  Volcker,	  attack	  the	  changes	  as	  unnecessary	  industry	  concessions.	  	  Said	  Rep.	  Maxine	  Waters	  (D-­‐Los	  Angeles):	  "Somehow,	  Wall	  Street	  bankers,	  the	  supposedly	  smartest	  people	  in	  the	  room,	  can't	  seem	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  law	  passed	  in	  2010	  by	  ...	  2017.	  .	  .	  Seven	  long	  years	  isn't	  enough.	  The	  Republicans	  and	  the	  banks	  want	  nearly	  a	  decade."3	  Volcker	  expressed	  similar	  sentiments,	  saying:	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  world’s	  leading	  investment	  bankers,	  noted	  for	  their	  cleverness	  and	  agility	  in	  advising	  clients	  on	  how	  to	  restructure	  companies	  and	  even	  industries	  however	  complicated,	  apparently	  can’t	  manage	  the	  orderly	  reorganization	  of	  their	  own	  activities	  in	  more	  than	  five	  years.	  .	  .	  Or,	  do	  I	  understand	  that	  lobbying	  is	  eternal,	  and	  by	  2017	  or	  beyond,	  the	  expectation	  can	  be	  fostered	  that	  the	  law	  itself	  can	  be	  changed?4	  	  As	  this	  article	  will	  demonstrate,	  recent	  debates	  over	  compliance	  dates	  are	  merely	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  long-­‐running	  dispute	  over	  the	  contours	  and	  coverage	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule.	  	  In	  part,	  of	  course,	  the	  long	  Volcker	  rule	  time	  line	  (illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1)	  stems	  from	  the	  sheer	  complexity	  of	  the	  rule	  and	  the	  activities	  it	  seeks	  to	  regulate.	  But	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  the	  many	  twists	  and	  turns	  in	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  life	  requires	  understanding	  its	  political	  history	  as	  well.	  That	  history	  suggests	  that	  the	  long	  implementation	  time	  line,	  political	  battles	  over	  the	  statute’s	  meaning	  and	  coverage,	  compliance	  hurdles,	  and	  uncertainty	  regarding	  key	  features	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://www.latimes.com/business/la-­‐fi-­‐dodd-­‐frank-­‐republicans-­‐volcker-­‐rule-­‐20150114-­‐story.html.	  4	  Peter	  Eavis,	  Fed’s	  Delay	  of	  Parts	  of	  Volcker	  Rule	  Is	  Another	  Victory	  for	  Banks,	  THE	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  DEALBOOK,	  (Dec.	  19,	  2014)	  
statute’s	  reach	  were	  all	  presaged	  by	  the	  rule’s	  political	  history.	  	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  it	  will	  be	  many	  years	  until	  the	  full	  impact	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  is	  understood	  and	  a	  complete	  weighing	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  is	  possible.	  Part	  II	  traces	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  as	  a	  political	  concession	  originally	  rejected	  by	  Obama	  administration	  leaders,	  who	  considered	  the	  rule	  both	  unnecessary	  and	  unworkable.	  Part	  III.A.	  discusses	  the	  statutory	  text,	  explaining	  that,	  for	  reasons	  both	  practical	  and	  political,	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  entered	  the	  rulemaking	  process	  with	  key	  issues	  still	  contested	  and	  unresolved,	  ensuring	  that	  disagreements	  regarding	  the	  rule’s	  scope	  continued	  into	  the	  rulemaking	  phase.	  Parts	  III.B	  and	  C	  discuss	  the	  earliest	  part	  of	  the	  rulemaking	  phase	  prior	  to	  the	  Notice	  of	  Proposed	  Rulemaking	  (“NPRM”)	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  “Pre-­‐NPRM	  Period”	  -­‐-­‐	  analyzing	  agency-­‐level	  lobbying	  efforts.	  An	  analysis	  of	  meeting	  logs	  and	  comment	  letters	  reveals	  unusually	  high	  interest	  in	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  with	  industry	  participants,	  the	  general	  public,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  weighing	  in	  on	  open	  issues.	  	  	  Part	  IV	  examines	  the	  “Post-­‐NPRM	  period,”	  which	  extends	  from	  the	  NPRM	  to	  the	  Final	  Rule,	  observing	  that	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  interest	  observed	  during	  the	  Pre-­‐NPRM	  phase	  of	  Volcker	  rule	  development	  continued	  into	  the	  final	  rulemaking	  stage.	  A	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  meeting	  logs	  and	  comment	  letters	  reveals	  that	  much	  of	  this	  activity	  involved	  the	  market	  making	  exemption.	  Specifically,	  commenters	  disputed	  how	  broadly	  the	  exemption	  should	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  limitations	  on	  banks’	  abilities	  to	  make	  markets	  would	  reduce	  market	  liquidity,	  and	  the	  likely	  costs	  of	  any	  such	  reduction,	  should	  it	  occur.	  	  Part	  V	  concludes.	  	  
II.	  THE	  BIRTH	  OF	  THE	  VOLCKER	  RULE	  The	  legislation	  that	  would	  eventually	  become	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  was	  born	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession	  when,	  on	  June	  17,	  2009,	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  outlined	  a	  basic	  framework	  of	  financial	  reform,	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  more	  substantial	  Treasury	  Department	  proposal.5	  The	  Volcker	  rule	  was	  not	  part	  of	  that	  proposal	  –	  indeed,	  only	  one	  sentence	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Department’s	  initial	  89-­‐page	  proposal	  even	  addressed	  proprietary	  trading.6	  	  	  But	  the	  Administration’s	  proposed	  financial	  reforms	  initially	  faced	  opposition	  from	  both	  the	  political	  left	  and	  right.	  	  Conservative	  republicans	  opposed	  the	  law	  as	  a	  “big	  government”	  tool	  that	  entrenched	  “too	  big	  too	  fail.”	  Liberals,	  meanwhile,	  complained	  that	  the	  proposed	  law	  was	  too	  soft	  on	  the	  big	  banks	  and	  failed	  to	  do	  enough	  for	  the	  consumers	  and	  working	  classes	  that	  had	  been	  hard	  hit	  by	  the	  recession.7	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  necessary	  support,	  therefore,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  number	  of	  concessions	  and	  revisions.	  One	  such	  revision	  was	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  provision	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  -­‐-­‐	  that	  would	  limit	  banks’	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  proprietary	  trading	  and	  to	  invest	  in	  or	  sponsor	  hedge	  or	  private	  equity	  funds.	  The	  brainchild	  of	  former	  Federal	  Reserve	  Chairman	  Paul	  Volcker,	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  was	  first	  floated	  in	  a	  January	  2009	  Group	  of	  Thirty	  report,	  but	  was	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-­‐of-­‐the-­‐President-­‐on-­‐Regulatory-­‐Reform/	  	  6	  Dep’t	  Of	  The	  Treasury,	  Financial	  Regulatory	  Reform:	  A	  New	  Foundation:	  Rebuilding	  
Financial	  Supervision	  And	  Regulation	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.	  7	  David	  Skeel,	  THE	  NEW	  FINANCIAL	  DEAL:	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  DODD–	  FRANK	  ACT	  AND	  ITS	  (UNINTENDED)	  CONSEQUENCES	  3	  (2011).	  
embraced	  at	  the	  time,	  either	  by	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  or	  by	  Congressional	  lawmakers.8	  Indeed,	  influential	  members	  of	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  including	  Tim	  Geithner	  and	  Larry	  Summers,	  actively	  resisted	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  believing	  that	  Dodd-­‐Frank’s	  new	  provisions	  governing	  systemically	  important	  institutions	  were	  sufficient	  to	  control	  risky	  bank	  behavior.9	  	  As	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  economic	  recession	  lingered	  into	  2010	  and	  public	  discontent	  continued	  unabated,	  however,	  Administration	  officials	  reportedly	  began	  to	  reevaluate	  Paul	  Volcker’s	  proposals	  to	  limit	  bank	  proprietary	  trading	  and	  fund	  activity.	  	  On	  January	  21,	  2010,	  President	  Obama,	  with	  Paul	  Volcker	  by	  his	  side,	  publicly	  announced	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Volcker	  rule.10	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  originated	  as	  a	  political	  concession.	  Dismissed	  by	  critics	  (including	  economists	  within	  the	  Obama	  administration)	  as	  unnecessary	  and	  unwieldy,	  it	  nonetheless	  became	  a	  key	  tool	  in	  a	  package	  of	  reforms	  designed	  to	  placate	  Wall	  Street	  critics	  who	  contended	  that	  Dodd–Frank	  did	  not	  do	  enough	  to	  contain	  risky	  financial	  institution	  behavior.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  however,	  for	  both	  practical	  and	  political	  reasons	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  legislature	  left	  key	  contested	  issues	  unresolved	  and	  delegated	  broad	  authority	  to	  federal	  agencies,	  ensuring	  that	  debates	  about	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  rule	  continued	  into	  the	  rulemaking	  phase.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Group	  Of	  Thirty,	  Financial	  Reform:	  A	  Framework	  For	  Regulatory	  Stability	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30	  Report.pdf.	  	  9	  Skeel,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  54–57;	  John	  Cassidy,	  The	  Volcker	  Rule:	  Obama’s	  Economic	  
Adviser	  and	  His	  Battles	  over	  the	  Financial-­Reform	  Bill,	  NEW	  YORKER,	  July	  26,	  2010,	  at	  25,	  27.	  	  10	  Press	  Release,	  White	  House,	  Remarks	  by	  the	  President	  on	  Financial	  Reform	  (Jan.	  21,	  2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/remarks-­‐president-­‐	  financial-­‐reform.	  
	  III.	  FROM	  STATUTE	  TO	  PROPOSED	  RULE	  –	  THE	  PRE-­‐NPRM	  PERIOD	  A.	  Text	  Subject	  to	  important	  exceptions,	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  prohibits	  “banking	  entities”	  (a	  defined	  term)	  from	  engaging	  in	  proprietary	  trading	  and	  from	  acquiring	  or	  retaining	  any	  equity,	  partnership,	  or	  other	  ownership	  interest	  in	  or	  sponsoring	  a	  hedge	  fund	  or	  a	  private	  equity	  fund.	  Although	  systemically	  important	  nonbanks	  may	  continue	  to	  engage	  in	  these	  activities,	  they	  must	  carry	  additional	  capital	  and	  comply	  with	  other	  restrictions	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  rendering	  the	  rule	  of	  interest	  to	  many	  large	  nonbank	  entities	  as	  well.11	  Both	  parts	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule—the	  ban	  on	  proprietary	  trading	  and	  the	  restrictions	  on	  fund	  investment	  and	  sponsorship—required	  extensive	  agency	  definition	  and	  rulemaking	  and,	  even	  now,	  pose	  open	  issues.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  ban	  on	  proprietary	  trading,	  for	  example,	  simply	  closing	  proprietary	  trading	  desks	  at	  affected	  firms	  is	  an	  easy	  enough	  matter.	  	  Even	  before	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  stand-­‐alone	  proprietary	  trading	  activity	  accounted	  for	  a	  relatively	  small	  portion	  of	  banking	  entity	  revenues.12	  But	  banks	  often	  take	  proprietary	  positions	  in	  the	  course	  of	  performing	  other	  activities	  explicitly	  permitted	  by	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  and	  which	  constitute	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  financial	  system,	  including	  market	  making,	  underwriting,	  hedging,	  and	  customer	  service.	  	  Effective	  Volcker	  rule	  implementation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  12	  U.S.C.	  §	  1851(a)(2)	  (2010).	  	  12	  U.S.	  Gov’t	  Accountability	  Office,	  Gao-­‐11-­‐529,	  Proprietary	  Trading:	  
Regulators	  Will	  Need	  More	  Comprehensive	  Information	  To	  Fully	  Monitor	  Compliance	  
With	  New	  Restrictions	  When	  Implemented	  16	  (2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11529.pdf.	  	  
and	  enforcement	  thus	  requires	  differentiating	  forbidden	  proprietary	  trading	  activity	  from	  these	  permitted	  behaviors.	  	  	  And	  therein	  lies	  much	  of	  the	  political	  tension	  and	  practical	  difficulty	  surrounding	  the	  Volcker	  rule.	  	  Critics	  warn	  that	  overly	  broad	  definitions	  or	  enforcement	  will	  curtail	  valuable	  efforts	  at	  market	  making	  or	  customer	  service,	  especially	  in	  thin	  markets,	  reducing	  market	  liquidity	  and	  impairing	  other	  beneficial	  functions	  performed	  by	  many	  banking	  entities.	  	  Supporters,	  in	  contrast,	  worry	  that	  regulated	  entities	  will	  seek	  to	  disguise	  risky	  proprietary	  activity	  as	  a	  permitted	  exemption,	  and	  urge	  the	  agencies	  to	  narrowly	  interpret	  statutory	  exemptions	  and	  strictly	  enforce	  the	  proprietary	  trading	  ban.13	  In	  sum,	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  like	  many	  Dodd–Frank	  provisions,	  entered	  the	  administrative	  process	  both	  highly	  incomplete	  and	  highly	  contested.	  The	  federal	  agencies	  charged	  with	  rulemaking	  under	  the	  statute	  would	  play	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  final	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  would	  likely	  do	  so	  under	  the	  continued	  watchful	  eye	  of	  affected	  industry	  members	  and	  other	  interested	  parties.	  	  
B.	  Meetings	  Efforts	  to	  influence	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  at	  the	  agency	  level	  began	  immediately	  after	  presidential	  signing.	  	  As	  part	  of	  the	  new	  transparency	  efforts	  associated	  with	  Dodd–Frank	  implementation,	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies,	  together	  with	  the	  Treasury	  Department,	  began	  disclosing	  their	  contacts	  regarding	  Dodd–Frank	  shortly	  after	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  infra	  notes	  28-­‐33	  and	  accompanying	  text	  (discussing	  these	  arguments	  in	  more	  detail).	  
bill	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  in	  July	  2010.14	  These	  logs	  give	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  work	  of	  Dodd–Frank	  statutory	  interpretation	  and	  implementation	  that	  goes	  on	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  	  They	  also	  demonstrate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  unresolved	  debates	  about	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  application	  and	  exemptions,	  many	  of	  which	  remain	  unresolved	  today,	  continued	  into	  the	  rulemaking	  phase.	  Table	  1	  and	  Figure	  2	  show	  the	  federal	  agency	  meetings	  at	  which	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  was	  discussed	  during	  what	  we	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “Pre-­‐NPRM	  Period”	  –	  the	  period	  between	  July	  21,	  2010,	  the	  date	  of	  presidential	  signing,	  and	  October	  11,	  2011,	  the	  date	  of	  the	  Notice	  of	  Proposed	  Rulemaking	  (NRPM).	  	  There	  were	  nearly	  450	  total	  meetings,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  which	  were	  with	  some	  sort	  of	  financial	  entity	  (for	  example,	  a	  bank,	  asset	  management	  entity,	  or	  insurance	  company)	  or	  the	  representative	  of	  such	  entity	  (for	  example,	  an	  industry	  trade	  group,	  law	  firm,	  or	  lobbying	  consultant).	  J.P.	  Morgan	  Chase,	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  and	  Morgan	  Stanley	  met	  with	  federal	  agencies	  most	  frequently	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  accounting	  for	  over	  15%	  of	  all	  federal	  agency	  meetings	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  during	  this	  time	  frame.15	  	  Law	  firms	  were	  also	  very	  active	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  accounting	  for	  nearly	  8%	  of	  federal	  agency	  meetings	  at	  which	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  was	  discussed.	  Of	  industry	  trade	  group	  meetings	  during	  the	  pre-­‐proposal	  period,	  SIFMA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Curtis	  W.	  Copeland,	  Cong.	  Research	  Serv.,	  R41472,	  Rulemaking	  
Requirements	  And	  Authorities	  In	  The	  Dodd–Frank	  Wall	  Street	  Reform	  And	  Consumer	  
Protection	  Act	  11	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/255/CRS-­‐R41472.pdf	  (discussing	  voluntary	  transparency	  efforts	  by	  the	  federal	  agencies	  charged	  with	  implementing	  Dodd–Frank,	  including	  logging	  interest	  group	  meetings	  and	  making	  such	  logs	  publicly	  available	  through	  agency	  websites).	  15	  See	  generally,	  Kimberly	  D.	  Krawiec,	  Don’t	  “Screw	  Joe	  the	  Plummer”:	  The	  Sausage-­
Making	  of	  Financial	  Reform,	  55	  ARIZ.	  L.	  REV.	  53	  (2013)	  (breaking	  down	  pre-­‐NPRM	  data	  in	  more	  detail).	  
(the	  Securities	  Industry	  and	  Financial	  Markets	  Association)	  and	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Roundtable	  met	  most	  frequently	  with	  federal	  agencies,	  accounting	  for	  40%	  of	  trade	  group	  meetings	  with	  regulators.	  	  Congressional	  meetings	  with	  regulators	  were	  made	  up	  solely	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  sponsors,	  Senators	  Merkley	  and	  Levin,	  and	  their	  staffs.	  	  	  
C.	  Comment	  Letters	  It	  is	  unusual,	  though	  not	  unheard	  of,	  to	  request	  written	  public	  feedback	  prior	  to	  rule	  proposal.	  For	  example,	  federal	  agencies	  sometimes	  issue	  an	  Advanced	  Notice	  of	  Proposed	  Rulemaking	  (ANPRM)	  to	  solicit	  feedback	  prior	  to	  drafting	  a	  proposed	  rule.16	  	  The	  Volcker	  rule,	  however,	  did	  not	  follow	  this	  pattern.	  Although	  the	  Volcker	  agencies	  did	  not	  issue	  an	  ANPRM,	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  required	  the	  newly	  formed	  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  (FSOC)	  to	  conduct	  a	  study	  and	  make	  recommendations	  on	  effective	  Volcker	  rule	  implementation	  not	  later	  than	  six	  months	  after	  the	  date	  of	  statute	  enactment.17	  	  Pursuant	  to	  that	  directive,	  beginning	  on	  October	  6,	  2010,	  FSOC	  solicited	  public	  input	  for	  a	  thirty-­‐day	  period	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  study.18	  	  We	  thus	  have	  a	  record	  of	  public	  comment	  activity	  prior	  to	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  NPRM,	  giving	  an	  additional	  window	  into	  agency-­‐level	  lobbying	  from	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  Volcker	  rule	  development.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Office	  of	  the	  Federal	  Register,	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Rulemaking	  Process,	  “How	  does	  an	  agency	  involve	  the	  public	  in	  developing	  a	  proposed	  rule?”	  https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.	  	  17	  12	  U.S.C.	  §	  1851(b)(2010).	  18	  Public	  Input	  for	  the	  Study	  Regarding	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Prohibitions	  on	  
Proprietary	  Trading	  and	  Certain	  Relationships	  With	  Hedge	  Funds	  and	  Private	  Equity	  
Funds,	  75	  Federal	  Register	  61758	  (October	  6,	  2010).	  
	  FSOC’s	  first	  action	  as	  a	  new	  council	  was	  to	  request	  public	  input	  on	  Volcker	  rule	  implementation—a	  request	  that,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Table	  2	  and	  Figure	  3,	  resulted	  in	  more	  than	  8,000	  comments.	  To	  put	  this	  number	  into	  context,	  studies	  repeatedly	  show	  limited	  comment	  activity	  in	  connection	  with	  most	  rulemakings,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  high-­‐salience	  issues	  that	  generate	  thousands	  (in	  a	  few	  cases,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands)	  of	  comments.19	  	  8000	  comments	  during	  a	  thirty	  day	  period	  in	  advance	  of	  a	  rule	  proposal	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  surprisingly	  high	  level	  of	  comment	  activity	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  was	  a	  high	  salience	  issue,	  even	  at	  this	  early	  stage.	  	  Of	  these	  8,000	  comment	  letters,	  FSOC	  concluded	  that	  roughly	  6,550	  “were	  substantially	  the	  same	  letter	  arguing	  for	  strong	  implementation	  of	  the	  Volcker	  Rule.”20	  In	  prior	  work,	  one	  of	  the	  present	  authors	  analyzed	  and	  hand-­‐coded	  the	  remaining,	  roughly	  1,450,	  comment	  letters,	  concluding	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  duplicate	  comment	  postings	  left	  a	  total	  of	  1,374	  comments,	  of	  which	  1,281,	  or	  93%,	  were	  submitted	  by	  private	  individuals.	  The	  remainder	  was	  submitted	  by	  financial	  industry	  members,	  industry	  trade	  groups,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  academics,	  and	  congressional	  members.	  	  	  A	  further	  breakdown	  of	  the	  1,281	  letters	  submitted	  by	  private	  individuals	  reveals	  several	  interesting	  patterns.	  First,	  contrary	  to	  “setting	  forth	  an	  individual	  perspective,”	  as	  concluded	  by	  FSOC,	  over	  half	  (nearly	  56%)	  of	  these	  comments	  use	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Cary	  Coglianese,	  Citizen	  Participation	  in	  Rulemaking:	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  Future,	  55	  DUKE	  L.J.	  943,	  950–59	  (2006)	  (summarizing	  empirical	  studies	  of	  rulemaking	  activity).	  20	  Fin.	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council,	  Study	  &	  Recommendations	  On	  Prohibitions	  On	  
Proprietary	  Trading	  &	  Certain	  Relationships	  With	  Hedge	  Funds	  &	  Private	  Equity	  
Funds	  10	  (2011).	  	  
the	  same	  form	  letter,	  with	  some	  slight	  variations,	  as	  the	  other	  6,550	  identical	  letters	  received	  by	  FSOC.	  These	  letters	  often	  add	  a	  sentence	  or	  two	  sharing	  some	  personal	  experience	  with	  the	  financial	  crisis	  or	  use	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  form	  letter,	  thus	  escaping	  whatever	  recognition	  software	  or	  rough	  exclusion	  methods	  FSOC	  employed.	  Yet,	  they	  are	  the	  same—nearly	  identical—substantive	  letter.	  Thus,	  of	  the	  8,000	  letters	  received	  by	  FSOC	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  7,316	  (or	  91%)	  are	  a	  form	  letter.	  This	  is	  roughly	  consistent	  with	  prior	  findings	  on	  private	  individual	  comment	  activity.21	  Second,	  these	  data	  reinforce	  a	  number	  of	  points	  highlighted	  by	  the	  earlier	  discussion,	  in	  Part	  II,	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  political	  history.	  	  The	  Volcker	  rule	  entered	  the	  rulemaking	  phase	  with	  important,	  contested	  points	  yet	  to	  be	  decided.	  	  A	  variety	  of	  stakeholders,	  including	  financial	  institutions	  and	  the	  general	  public,	  participated	  in	  the	  rulemaking	  process,	  from	  the	  earliest	  stage,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Final	  Rule.	  	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  most	  rulemakings,	  which	  receive	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  comments,	  very	  few	  of	  which	  emanate	  from	  private	  individuals.	  	  Yet	  the	  method	  by	  which	  stakeholders	  participated	  in	  the	  Pre-­‐NPRM	  stage	  of	  Volcker	  rulemaking	  differs.	  	  Financial	  institutions	  and	  their	  representatives	  were	  most	  active	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  agency	  meetings	  and	  were	  less	  active	  in	  comment	  letter	  writing,	  both	  as	  compared	  to	  private	  individuals	  and	  as	  compared	  to	  financial	  institution	  letter	  writing	  in	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  period	  (discussed	  in	  Part	  IV).	  	  Private	  individuals,	  in	  contrast,	  while	  surprisingly	  active	  in	  letter	  writing,	  were	  wholly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  See,	  e.g.,	  Mariano-­‐Florentino	  Cuéllar,	  Rethinking	  Regulatory	  Democracy,	  57	  ADMIN.	  L.	  REV.	  411,	  449	  (2005).	  
absent	  from	  agency	  meetings.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  letters	  from	  private	  individuals	  were	  form	  letters.	  	  And	  unique	  individual	  letters	  were	  far	  from	  sophisticated.	  Comments	  from	  the	  general	  public	  were	  short—the	  average	  word	  count	  (excluding	  form	  letters)	  is	  only	  86,	  and	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  comments,	  again	  excluding	  form	  letters,	  are	  less	  than	  50	  words.	  	  Few,	  if	  any,	  contain	  specific	  substantive	  suggestions	  for	  interpreting	  and	  implementing	  the	  Volcker	  Rule.22	  	  IV.	  FROM	  PROPOSED	  RULE	  TO	  FINAL	  RULE	  –	  THE	  POST-­‐NPRM	  PERIOD	  On	  October	  11,	  2011,	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies,	  other	  than	  the	  CFTC,	  issued	  a	  Notice	  of	  Proposed	  Rulemaking	  (NPRM)	  requesting	  comments	  on	  proposed	  rules	  to	  implement	  the	  Volcker	  legislation	  prior	  to	  January	  13,	  2012.	  That	  deadline	  was	  later	  extended	  to	  February	  13,	  2012.	  The	  CFTC,	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  3–2,	  adopted	  the	  entire	  text	  of	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies’	  proposed	  rule	  in	  an	  NPRM	  dated	  February	  14,	  2012,	  requesting	  comments	  prior	  to	  April	  16,	  2012.	  	  Comments	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  were	  collected	  in	  a	  single	  OCC	  docket	  on	  Regulations.gov.23	  Each	  agency,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Treasury	  Department,	  also	  maintained	  separate	  logs	  documenting	  meetings	  set	  up	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  discussing	  the	  Volcker	  rule.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  evident	  from	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  period	  continued	  into	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  phase.	  Participants	  included	  affected	  industry	  members,	  industry	  trade	  groups,	  and	  their	  representatives,	  as	  well	  as	  private	  individuals,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  academics,	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  government	  entities	  and	  agencies,	  and	  members	  of	  Congress.	  This	  represents	  an	  even	  greater	  diversity	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  comment	  letter	  process	  than	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  period.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Krawiec,	  supra	  note	  15	  (discussing	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  data	  in	  more	  detail).	  23	  See,	  Volcker	  Rule	  -­‐	  Prohibition	  on	  Proprietary	  Trading	  and	  Certain	  Relationships	  with	  Hedge	  Funds	  and	  Private	  Equity	  Funds,	  Docket	  ID:	  OCC-­‐2011-­‐0014	  (available	  at,	  http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;D=OCC-­‐2011-­‐0014).	  	  
	  
A.	  Meetings	  During	  the	  period	  between	  Oct.	  11,	  2011,	  the	  date	  of	  the	  NPRM,	  and	  December	  10,	  2013,	  the	  date	  of	  final	  rule	  issuance,	  there	  were	  947	  meetings	  with	  federal	  agencies	  to	  discuss	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  Of	  these,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  meetings	  were	  with	  financial	  institutions	  and	  their	  representatives	  (law	  and	  consulting	  firms	  and	  industry	  trade	  groups),	  followed	  by	  members	  of	  other	  affected	  industries,	  such	  as	  asset	  management	  and	  insurance	  companies,	  and	  their	  trade	  associations,	  law,	  and	  consulting	  firms.	  	  Although	  nonindustry	  voices	  were	  represented,	  they	  were	  far	  less	  numerous,	  both	  as	  compared	  to	  industry	  voices	  and	  as	  compared	  to	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  comment	  letter	  analysis	  discussed	  in	  Part	  IV.B,	  below.	  Roughly	  11%	  of	  meetings	  were	  held	  with	  public	  interest	  groups,	  less	  than	  2%	  with	  academics,	  and	  just	  under	  5%	  with	  foreign	  (3.1%)	  and	  domestic	  (.3%)	  government	  entities	  and	  members	  of	  congress	  or	  their	  staff	  (1.3%).	  	  Though	  the	  percentage	  of	  meetings	  commanded	  by	  nonindustry	  stakeholders	  is	  relatively	  small,	  as	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  comparison	  in	  Table	  1,	  both	  public	  interest	  groups	  and	  academics	  command	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  meetings	  in	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  period,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  period.	  	  Moreover,	  foreign	  and	  state	  governments	  are	  seen	  only	  in	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  data,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies	  had	  access	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  viewpoints	  during	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  period	  than	  in	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  phase.	  	  B.	  Comments	  The	  unusually	  high	  volume	  of	  comment	  letter	  activity	  seen	  during	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  pre-­‐NPRM	  phase	  carried	  though	  to	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  phase.	  As	  shown	  by	  Table	  3,	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies	  received	  nearly	  18,500	  comments	  during	  the	  post-­‐NPRM	  period.	  	  Letters	  from	  private	  individuals	  far	  outpace	  participation	  by	  any	  other	  group,	  representing	  98%	  of	  total	  letters	  received	  (n=18,109).	  As	  was	  the	  case	  during	  the	  pre-­‐NPRM	  period,	  however,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  comments	  are	  form	  letters	  from	  the	  general	  public.	  	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  Table	  3	  and	  Figure	  5.A.	  –	  of	  the	  18,450	  letters	  received,	  only	  381	  (or	  just	  over	  2%)	  were	  
unique,	  as	  opposed	  to	  form,	  letters.24	  Although	  individuals	  were	  the	  most	  frequent	  users	  of	  form	  letters,	  submitting	  three	  different	  varieties	  totaling	  18,039	  comments,	  we	  also	  identified	  the	  use	  of	  form	  letters	  by	  affected	  industry	  members,	  specifically	  insurance	  companies	  and	  venture	  capital	  firms.	  	  Looking	  only	  at	  unique	  comment	  letters,	  shown	  in	  figure	  5.B.,	  although	  industry	  players	  dominate,	  private	  individual	  and	  congressional	  member	  comments	  are	  nearly	  as	  numerous.	  	  Moreover,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  academics,	  foreign	  and	  state	  governments,	  and	  others	  also	  provided	  unique	  comment	  letters.	  	  	  	  
C.	  Content	  What	  issues	  were	  being	  raised	  in	  these	  letters?	  	  The	  Agencies	  themselves	  provide	  much	  information	  on	  this	  question,	  in	  Attachment	  B	  to	  the	  Adopting	  Release	  of	  the	  final	  rule.25	  	  This	  information	  is	  selective,	  however,	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  systematic	  and	  inclusive	  account	  of	  comment	  letter	  content.	  	  We,	  therefore,	  systematically	  coded	  the	  comment	  letters	  for	  content,	  using	  sorting	  software	  to	  analyze	  the	  results.	  	  We	  were	  interested	  not	  only	  in	  the	  types	  of	  issues	  raised	  and	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  rule	  suggested,	  but	  also	  in	  which	  types	  of	  commenters	  made	  which	  suggestions,	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  persuasive	  tactics	  they	  employed.	  Elsewhere,	  we	  discuss	  this	  analysis	  in	  more	  detail.26	  	  Here,	  however,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  issue	  most	  often	  raised	  by	  commenters	  –	  the	  market	  making	  exemption.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  Volcker	  Agencies	  counted	  600	  unique	  comment	  letters.	  	  We	  believe	  that	  our	  count	  is	  more	  accurate,	  however,	  as	  the	  agency	  count	  identifies	  some	  industry	  form	  letters	  as	  unique	  and	  appears	  to	  double	  count	  what	  are	  actually	  copies	  of	  the	  same	  letter.	  	  See	  Office	  of	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency,	  Treasury	  (“OCC”);	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System	  (“Board”);	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Corporation	  (“FDIC”);	  and	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (“SEC”),	  
Prohibitions	  And	  Restrictions	  On	  Proprietary	  Trading	  And	  Certain	  Interests	  In,	  And	  
Relationships	  With,	  Hedge	  Funds	  And	  Private	  Equity	  Funds:	  Final	  Rule,	  Attachment	  B	  (Dec.	  10,	  2013).	  25	  Id.	  26	  Kimberly	  D.	  Krawiec	  &	  Guangya	  Liu,	  Pointless	  Pluralism?	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  
Volcker	  Rulemaking	  (unpublished	  draft	  on	  file	  with	  authors).	  
The	  comments	  addressed	  all	  major	  provisions	  of	  the	  proposed	  Volcker	  rule.27	  The	  most	  commonly	  discussed	  substantive	  provision,	  however,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Table	  4,	  was	  the	  market-­‐making	  exemption,	  which	  was	  addressed	  by	  nearly	  a	  third	  of	  all	  comment	  letters.	  Interest	  in	  the	  market-­‐making	  exemption	  was	  broad-­‐based	  –	  indeed,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  Table	  5,	  every	  commenter	  type,	  except	  venture	  capital	  firms,	  addressed	  the	  market	  making	  exemption	  in	  comments.	  	  Nonfinancial	  institution	  commenters	  raised	  the	  issue	  most	  often,	  with	  80%	  of	  letters	  addressing	  market	  making.	  	  Financial	  institutions,	  foreign	  governments,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  and	  lobbying	  firms	  also	  commonly	  addressed	  the	  market	  making	  exemption,	  raising	  it	  in	  nearly	  half	  of	  letters.	  	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies’	  own	  comment	  letter	  analysis,	  which	  noted	  “the	  Agencies	  received	  significant	  comment	  regarding	  the	  proposed	  market-­‐making	  exemption.”28	  Much	  of	  that	  commentary	  involved	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  exemption	  on	  financial	  markets,	  with	  commenters	  disagreeing,	  sometimes	  quite	  aggressively,	  about	  those	  impacts.	  	  For	  example,	  some	  commenters	  argued	  that	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  as	  proposed,	  would	  limit	  bank’s	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  market	  making,	  with	  negative	  effects	  on	  market	  liquidity,	  price	  discovery,	  bid-­‐ask	  spreads,	  and	  capital	  formation.29	  	  	  Others	  disputed	  these	  contentions.	  	  Some	  commenters,	  including	  Paul	  Volcker,	  argued	  that	  reduced	  market	  liquidity	  was	  a	  benefit,	  rather	  than	  a	  cost.30	  	  More	  commonly,	  however,	  commenters	  disputed	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  would	  reduce	  market	  liquidity,	  even	  if	  banks	  ultimately	  engaged	  in	  less	  market	  making	  activity.	  Some	  argued,	  for	  example,	  that	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  limited	  banks’	  ability	  to	  make	  markets,	  other	  entities	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  would	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.31	  Others	  argued	  that	  banks	  currently	  take	  liquidity	  from	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Attachment	  B,	  supra	  note	  24	  at	  5.	  28	  Id.	  at	  142.	  29	  Id.	  at	  149-­‐150.	  30	  See,	  e.g.,	  Letter	  of	  Paul	  Volcker.	  31	  Attachment	  B,	  supra	  note	  24	  at	  152	  (discussing	  these	  comments).	  
market,	  by	  attempting	  “to	  beat”	  other	  institutional	  investors,	  and	  that	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  would	  add	  some	  market	  liquidity,	  by	  prohibiting	  such	  opportunism.32	  	  	  Our	  analysis	  confirms	  this	  commenter	  interest	  in	  market	  liquidity	  issues.	  	  Table	  4,	  for	  example,	  shows	  that	  a	  full	  40%	  of	  commenters	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  liquidity	  impacts	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  –	  more	  than	  any	  other	  type	  of	  economic	  argument	  that	  was	  raised.	  Other	  frequently	  raised	  concerns	  included	  arguments	  about	  the	  general	  economic	  costs	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  (32%	  of	  commenters)	  and	  concerns	  about	  systemic	  risk	  or	  too	  big	  to	  fail	  (normally	  raised	  by	  commenters	  writing	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule).	  As	  noted	  above,	  these	  concerns	  about	  the	  liquidity	  impacts	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  are	  closely	  tied	  to	  debates	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  market	  making	  exemption.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  4,	  some	  commenters	  (16,	  by	  our	  count)	  relied	  on	  or	  challenged	  (10	  commenters)	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  study	  by	  Stanford	  economics	  professor	  Darrell	  Duffie	  commissioned	  by	  SIFMA,	  which	  enumerated	  a	  number	  of	  negative	  effects	  from	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  related	  to	  banks’	  impaired	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  market	  making,	  including	  reduced	  liquidity	  and	  financial	  system	  stability.33	  	  	  V.	  CONCLUSION	  	  The	  Volcker	  rule	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contested	  and	  protracted	  rulemaking	  tasks	  imposed	  by	  Dodd-­‐Frank.	  	  Politicians,	  academics,	  market	  participants,	  and	  the	  general	  public	  continue	  to	  debate	  the	  rule’s	  costs	  and	  benefits	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Id.	  See	  also,	  John	  C.	  Coates	  IV,	  Cost-­Benefit	  Analysis	  of	  Financial	  Regulation:	  Case	  
Studies	  and	  Implications,	  124	  YALE	  L.	  J.,	  882,	  974-­‐78	  (2015)	  (discussing	  the	  difficulty	  of	  assessing	  the	  costs	  of	  lost	  market	  liquidity	  stemming	  from	  the	  Volcker	  rule);	  Onnig	  H.	  Dombalagian,	  The	  Expressive	  Synergies	  of	  the	  Volcker	  Rule,	  54	  Boston	  College	  L.	  Rev.	  469	  (2013)	  (discussing	  the	  market	  making	  exemption	  and	  its	  potential	  liquidity	  effects	  in	  detail).	  33	  Darrell	  Duffie,	  Market	  Making	  Under	  the	  Proposed	  Volcker	  Rule	  (January	  16,	  2012),	  available	  at	  http://www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/policy/duffievolckerrule.pdf.	  	  
and	  will	  likely	  do	  so	  for	  some	  time	  to	  come.34	  As	  this	  article	  demonstrates,	  this	  contentiousness	  was	  presaged	  by	  the	  rule’s	  political	  history.	  	  	  The	  Volcker	  rule	  originated,	  not	  out	  of	  a	  deep	  Obama	  administration	  commitment	  to	  the	  provision,	  but	  as	  a	  political	  concession	  designed	  to	  placate	  Wall	  Street	  critics	  who	  contended	  that	  Dodd–Frank	  did	  not	  do	  enough	  to	  contain	  risky	  financial	  institution	  behavior.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  deep	  divisions	  about	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  rule,	  it	  emerged	  from	  the	  legislature	  with	  key	  issues	  unresolved	  and	  delegated	  broad	  authority	  to	  federal	  agencies	  to	  determine	  the	  ultimate	  scope	  of	  the	  rule.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Volcker	  rule,	  like	  many	  Dodd–Frank	  provisions,	  entered	  the	  administrative	  process	  both	  highly	  incomplete	  and	  highly	  contested,	  ensuring	  that	  debates	  about	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  statute’s	  prohibitions	  continued	  into	  the	  rulemaking	  phase.	  Efforts	  to	  influence	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  at	  the	  agency	  level	  began	  immediately	  after	  presidential	  signing,	  through	  both	  meetings	  with	  Volcker	  agency	  personnel	  and	  letter	  writing	  campaigns.	  	  Those	  expressing	  an	  opinion	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  prohibitions	  included	  affected	  industry	  members,	  public	  interest	  groups,	  academics,	  and	  the	  general	  public,	  among	  others.	  	  This	  interest	  only	  intensified	  after	  the	  NPRM,	  when	  more	  than	  18,000	  separate	  commenters	  wrote	  in	  to	  express	  their	  views	  on	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  and	  concerned	  stakeholders	  continued	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meetings	  with	  the	  Volcker	  Agencies.	  	  	  It	  is	  thus	  not	  surprising	  that	  today,	  more	  than	  six	  years	  after	  the	  Group	  of	  Thirty	  report	  in	  which	  Paul	  Volcker	  first	  outlined	  his	  proposal	  and	  more	  than	  five	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See,	  e.g.,	  Roberta	  Romano,	  Regulating	  In	  The	  Dark	  And	  A	  Postscript	  Assessment	  Of	  
The	  Iron	  Law	  Of	  Financial	  Regulation,	  43	  HOFSTRA	  L.	  REV.	  25,	  69-­‐75	  (2014)	  (discussing	  this	  debate	  and	  criticizing	  the	  Volcker	  rule	  and	  the	  broad	  delegation	  of	  Congressional	  authority	  that	  it	  represents).	  
years	  after	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  was	  first	  signed	  into	  law,	  there	  remains	  much	  uncertainty	  about	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  application,	  contentious	  disputes	  about	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  rule,	  and	  much	  work	  still	  be	  done	  before	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  the	  Volcker	  rule’s	  prohibitions	  are	  completely	  understood	  and	  a	  full	  accounting	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  can	  begin.	  	  	  









































































































































































































































































































	  	  	  	   Figure	  2.	  Pre-­‐NPRM	  Meetings	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Pre-­‐NPRM	  Comments	  	  
	  
	  	  	   Figure	  4.	  Post-­‐NPRM	  Meetings	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  5A.	  Post-­‐NPRM	  Comment	  Letters	  	  
	  
	   Figure	  5B.	  Post-­‐NPRM	  Unique	  Comment	  Letters	  	  
	  	  	  	  




Meetings  % Type 
# of 
Meetin
gs  % 
Financial Institution 250 55.8 
Financial 
Institution 345 36.4 
Asset Mgmt 64 14.3 Asset Mgmt 133 14.0 
Law Firm 35 7.8 
Industry Trade 
Group 119 12.6 
Industry Trade Group 29 6.5 Public Interest 108 11.4 
Insurance 23 5.1 Law Firm 81 8.6 
Public Interest 19 4.2 Insurance 55 5.8 
Non-financial Corp. 12 2.7 Foreign Govt. 29 3.1 
Congress  10 2.2 
Non-financial 
Corp. 22 2.3 
Lobbying  4 0.9 Lobbying  19 2.0 
Academic  2 0.4 Academic  18 1.9 
Foreign Govt. 0 0.0 Congress  12 1.3 
Miscellaneous 0 0.0 State Govt. 3 0.3 
State Govt. 0 0.0 Miscellaneous 3 0.3 
Total 448 100.0 Total 947 100.0 	  
	  
Table 2. Pre-NPRM Comment Letters    
 # % of 
total 
% of total 
unique 
letters 
Form Letters    
Private Individual Using Form Letter 766 55.7  
Total Form Letters 766 55.7  
Unique Letters    
Private Individual 515   
 Industry Trade Group 26   











Congress*   7   
Total Unique Comment Letters 608 2.1 100.0 
Total Comment Letters 1374 100.0  
    
    
    
*Includes members of Congress and their staff     
 
***Includes public interest, research, advocacy, and labor organizations  
† Includes academics and public intellectuals    
	  	  	  
Table 3. Post-NPRM Comment Letters    
 # % of 
total 
% of total 
unique 
letters 
Form Letters    
Private Individual Using Form Letter 1 15,639 84.7  
Private Individual Using Form Letter 2 1,757 9.5  
Private Individual Using Form Letter 3 643 3.5  
Insurance Form Letter 20 0.1  
Venture Capital Form Letter 10 0.1  
Total Form Letters 18,069 97.9  
Unique Letters    
Industry Trade Group  102 0.6 26.8 
 Private Individual 64 0.3 16.8 
Financial Institution 44 0.2 11.5 
Congress*   33 0.2 8.7 
Asset Mgmt 33 0.2 8.7 
Foreign Govt.** 17 0.1 4.5 
Law Firm 15 0.1 3.9 
Public Interest*** 15 0.1 3.9 
Venture Capital  14 0.1 3.7 
Academic† 14 0.1 3.7 
State Govt.†† 10 0.1 2.6 
Insurance  9 0.0 2.4 
Non-financial Corp.  7 0.0 1.8 
Lobbying††† 4 0.0 1.0 
Total Unique Comment Letters 381 2.1 100.0 
Total Comment Letters 18,450 100.0  
    
    
    
*Includes members of Congress and their staff     
**Includes Foreign governments, entities, central banks, regulatory bodies, and international 
organizations acting on their behalf 
***Includes public interest, research, advocacy, and labor organizations  
† Includes academics and public intellectuals    
††Includes state and municipal governments, subdivisions, and officials  
†††Includes lobbying or political consulting firms 
 
   	  

Table	  4.	  Exemptions	  Raised	  By	  Comment	  Letters	  	  
	   Table	  5.	  Issues	  Raised	  By	  Entity	  Type	  	   	  	  
